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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
I. INTRODUTION 
addressed three main issues in this appeal: 1- Denial of due process 
the state's frequent and ongoing violations the rules of evidence; 2- Den;al of the 
for mistrial after a blatant violation of the Court's pre-trial order; 3- Denial by the 
Court of appellant's ICR 29 motion to dismiss, (denial of the ICR 35 discussed below). 
Any of these three matters standing alone is sufficient to grant the relief requested, the 
cumulative effect of the three issues mandates that the findings of guilt on the two of 
eight charges be reversed. 
II. ARGUMENT 
In the plaintiff-respondent's Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The 
Proceedings, it argues in Statement of Facts section that after being employed for a 
while, BC, (the victim in the underlying case), asked if she could earn extra money by 
cleaning, Sigler declined the offer, but told her she could earn extra money by taking 
pictures. When she inquired as to the type of pictures he informed her it would involve 
taking off her clothes, (Respondent's Brf, p 1 ). These statements by BC consist of trial 
testimony, which makes said statements questions of fact for· the jury and should not be 
asserted in the Fact section of the state's brief. These assertions were countered when the 
appellant testified that BC came to him office with the camera, took his picture at his 
desk, and then asked appellant to take pictures of her for her boyfriend, (JT Tr p 1069, 11 
16-22). The appellant testified, "Well, she handed me the camera and says, "Here, take 
this picture. Then she is - lifts up her shirt. And at that point I was startled. She says, 
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s okay. My boyfriend likes this," so I took the picture.", (JT Tr p 1070, 11 2-7). The 
state then improperly asserts that Sigler loaded the pictures on to his computer, 
(Respondent's Brf, p 2). Once again this is testimony by was countered the 
appellant testifies that after he handed the camera back to BC, she took out the flash card 
and placed it in a USB card reader attached to her laptop, and the appellant never saw the 
digital camera card again, (JT Tr p 1071, 115-18). 
The state argues that the fact the appellant was forced to make a large number of 
objections is not enough, standing alone, to constitute a violation of due process. This 
argument discounts and disregards the substance of these trial objections, and more 
importantly, ignores the cumulative effect on the jury created by these endless 
interactions between and among the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and the judge while 
dealing with these objections. These issues rise to the level of due process violations and 
also constitute fundamental error. At some point early in the trial, these endless 
interactions reached the point of prosecutorial misconduct that deprived the appellant of a 
fair trial. 
The Supreme Court has held that prosecutorial misconduct is insufficient to 
overturn a conviction unless it "so infect[ s] the trial with unfairness as to make the 
resulting conviction a denial of due process." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 
643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871-72, 40 L.Ed.2d 431(1974). 
The issue is addressed in State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269,270 P.3d 1054 
(Ct.App.2011), where the Court held in pertinent part: 
"However, prosecutorial misconduct may so infect the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process even 
when objections are sustained. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765-66, 107 
S.Ct. 3102, 3108-09, 97 L.Ed.2d 618, 630-31 (1987); Sanchez, 142 Idaho 
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at 318, 127 P .3d at 221. To constitute a due process violation, the 
prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result in the 
denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. Greer, 483 at 765, 107 
S.Ct. at 3108-09, L.Ed.2d at 630; Sanchez, 142 Idaho at 318. 127 P.3d 
at 221. Thus, when prosecutorial misconduct may have resulted in a 
violation of due process, the trial court's decision to sustain or overrule a 
contemporaneous defense objection to the prosecutor's comment is not 
determinative of whether this Court will review the issue. See Greer, 483 
U.S. at 764-65, 107 S.Ct. at 3108-09, 97 L.Ed.2d at 629-30; State v. 
Gamble, 146 Idaho 331,344, 193 P.3d 878,891 (Ct.App.2008); Sanchez, 
142 Idaho at 318, 127 P.3d at 221. Instead, "[w]hether the trial court 
sustains an objection to an impermissible question, or whether the 
prosecutor is allowed to refer to [impermissible information] in his or her 
closing arguments, are questions that are relevant to the harmless-error 
inquiry, or to deciding whether the error made the trial fundamentally 
unfair." Greer, 483 U.S. at 767, 107 S.Ct. at 3109-10, 97 L.Ed.2d at 631 
(Stevens, J., concurring)." 
Case law in Idaho is scarce on the issue of appellant making objections to 
preserve the record after Perry, (supra). Though of no precedential value in 
Idaho, a Mississippi Court of Appeals decision has come close to encapsulating 
the issues in appellant's case in Bailey v. State, 956 So.2d 1016 (Miss.App.2007): 
"Bailey claims that the circuit court erred when it allowed the 
prosecution to ask three witnesses: Officer Bobby Nichols, Dr. Hayne, and 
Detective Camel, questions that were improper, prejudicial, and 
inflammatory. Bailey submits that, because his counsel was forced to 
object to questions that were designed to provoke such a response, the 
prosecution tactically caused the jury to become unsympathetic to Bailey 
and were therefore less likely to find for Bailey. According to Bailey's 
brief, "Such choices present a Damoclean choice for counsel, who must 
balance antagonizing the jury of laymen unfamiliar with the necessity for 
such objections with zealous protection of his or her client." Bailey 
claims that tht; cumulative effect of those forced objections resulted in a 
violation of his constitutional rights. However, there is no evidence that 
the jury was unsympathetic to Bailey based on the frequency of his 
attorney's objections", 956 So.2d at 1039 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, appellant argues that this Court cannot discern the 
issue as stated in Bailey: "that the jury was unsympathetic to Bailey based on the 
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frequency of his attorney's objections", as there is no mechanism available to a 
defendant during a jury trial to definitively determine if the jury's verdict is 
influenced by defense counsel's actions. 
did not receive a fair trial. 
record here establishes the appellant 
In State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 972 P.2d 737 (Idaho App. 1998), the Court of 
Appeals held as follows: 
"We must next determine whether this prosecutorial misconduct requires that the 
judgment be vacated. An error or defect in a criminal trial that does not affect substantial 
rights of the defendant will not necessitate a new trial. I.C.R. 52; State v. Pizzuto, 119 
ldaho 742,753,810 P.2d 680,691 (1991). That is, convictions will not be set aside for 
"small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of 
the trial." Chapman v. California,386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, (1967). 
See also State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho l 08. 111, 594 P.2d 146, 149 (1979); Reynolds, 120 
Idaho at 451 n. 5, 816 P .2d at 1008 n. 5. Where prosecutorial misconduct is shovm, the 
test for harmless error is whether the appellate court can conclude, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the result of the trial would not have been different absent the misconduct. 
Reynolds, 120 Idaho at 451, 816 P.2d at 1008; Baruth, 107 Idaho at 658,691 P.2d at 
1273. 
Once again, in examining these repeated and ongoing dialogues among the 
parties, this Court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the result of the trial on the 
two convictions would have been different absent the misconduct. This Court must also 
consider whether the state's method of presenting their case forcing the appellant to make 
numerous and repeated objections was a situation of episodic/ongoing incompetence on 
the part of the prosecutors or intentional prosecutorial misconduct. The appellant argues 
this consideration between these two scenarios is of little/no consequence- the issue is the 
effect on the jury, and this Court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's 
finding of guilt on the two charges was not affected by the state's behavior during the 
trial. 
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One glaring example this succession of due process violations is seen at the 
time the appellant objects when state asks a series of questions that is characterized 
defense counsel as follows:'' ... seems like all last four questions have all been 
leading.", (JT Tr p 515, 114-6). The objection was sustained, and the prosecutor asks, 
"Your Honor, may I just maybe ask the Court for some leniency in just setting up some 
foundational issues, just to move the case along?", (JT Tr p 515, 11 8-11 ). This request 
and the ensuing dialogue illustrates the appellant's frustration with the way the state 
presented its case and the implicit/explicit maltreatment of the rules of evidence. A 
questioner can request to treat a witness as hostile and utilize leading questions if the 
proper foundation can be established. Alternatively, the Court may, in its discretion, 
allow leading questions on direct examination when a questioner is attempting to 
establish foundation for later inquiries. But the act of requesting "leniency" in order to 
violate the rules of evidence is improper, and there is no permissible purpose for this 
request. These objectionable questions went beyond foundation. The violation in this 
case is compounded when the judge responds- with the jury present in the courtroom- as 
follows, "Well, you have to ask counsel. He's got a right to hold you to the Rules of 
Evidence.", (JT Tr p 515, 1112-14). The Court's frustration with the way the state was 
presenting its case is obvious, but this response by the Court is flawed on many levels. 
During a jury trial, defense counsel is charged with making objections so the Court can 
make rulings. In this case, the Court should not have instructed the jury that the 
prosecutor, "will have to ask counsel.", which: 1- Improperly instructs the jury that it is 
up to defense counsel whether to require the rules of evidence to be enforced; 2-
Arguably misinforms the jury that defense counsel has control of the prosecutor's line of 
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questioning; 3- Has the appearance of the Court abandoning its responsibility assunng 
fairness and truth in applying said rules, and; Implicitly tells the jury that defense 
counsel has the power to impeded/slow down process. It is important to note the 
Court did not make a specific ruling on the state's request for "leniency", Jury was 
left with the Court's erroneous response that improperly shifted the role of evidentiary 
gatekeeper to the appellant, (JT Tr p 515, 11 8-18). Lay jurors uninformed about the 
intricacies and interplay inherent in the rules of evidence and testimony during trial could 
be left with the impression that the Court was essentially telling defense counsel to sit 
down and shut up when defense counsel was in fact trying to do his job under the criteria 
set forth in State v Perry, 150 Idaho 209, (2010), and advocate for his client. The record 
establishes that the Court was imperturbable and respectful when making evidentiary 
rulings, but the jury was, once again, left with the impression that the appellant's 
objections were made to keep harmful information from the jury or to delay the process. 
Appellant is not relying only on merely the raw number of objections to establish 
violations of due process, fundamental error, and cumulative error. Further specific 
examples of evidentiary objections by appellant, rulings by the Court, responses by the 
state, and effects on the jury are as follows: 
The prosecutor asks, "Okay. Was there ever a time that when you were called 
into his office that something, I guess, happened in the office that drew you attention to 
the computer?" Appellant objects on the basis of overbroad and leading, and the 
objections are sustained. In response, the state inquires of the Court, "Too overbroad?", 
(JT Tr p 516, 11 2-9). The state asks essentially the exact same question in a more leading 
fashion, (though the objection to this question was "overbroad"), and the subsequent 
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objection was sustained, (JT Tr p 516, 1110-15). Appellant argues here that the state 
its credit, the Court did not respond to this inquiry, but as a result this of 
questioning, the improper evidence concerning the appellant showing pictures of his 
negligee clad wife1 to the witness was placed in front of the jury. The jury was then 
excused at the request of appellant, (JI p 517, 11 1-25, p 518, 111-2)2. This entire line 
of questioning was improper, the appellant objected four times in less than three pages in 
the jury trial transcript, and the improper evidence was still placed in front of the jury. 
Appellant argues that the jury would conclude from this exchange that the appellant was 
attempting to conceal the fact that the appellant showed a male employee pictures of his 
wife in a negligee. Once again, the jury could find that a husband that would violate the 
trust of his wife by showing compromising pictures to others would be capable of 
committing the crimes for which he is charged. This is improper propensity evidence 
that was extremely damaging to the appellant's case and specifically excluded by the 
Court in a prior rulings.3 
The appellant objected to another blatant leading question, "-and you expressed 
to him your vvishes to want to go out on your own; is that right?", (JT Tr p 582, 11 18-19). 
In sustaining the objection, the Court admonishes the prosecutor as follows, "Counsel, 
1 This evidence had been ruled inadmissible in a prior ruling by the Court, see arguments infra addressing 
the request for a mistrial, (Appellant's 2nd Issue). The Court also explains its ruling in explicit detail for 
some four pages in the jury trial transcript, (JT Tr p 436, 11 1025, through p 439, 11 1-20) 
2 Another example of the appearance of appellant impeding the process. 
3 "THE COURT: What we are arguing about, Counsel, is I gave a specific ruling. That ruling was not to 
discuss pictures of other women, either in lingerie or partially clothed or nude. [P} And there is a reason 
for that: Because of the rulings of the Idaho Supreme Court. And I cited specifically and went over it again 
after the lunch hour, the Grist decision, which restricts the ability to use this type of evidence. [P] And the 
defendant [sic] then spoke of the alleged-of the defendant's wife being in a negligee in these pictures, 
which is in direct contravention of what this Court's ruling was. [P] And now I find that the witness was 
being called to testify with regard to photographs of the alleged victim, which according to the police report 
the witness never saw.", (JT Tr p 524, 11 19-25, p 525, 11 1-12). 
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you have to avoid the leading questions.", Tr p 583, 111-2). This is another example 
the continuing pattern: the Court is outside its role as a neutral arbiter with the 
responsibility of ruling on evidentiary issues into the role instructing the state to 
present their case under the rules of evidence.4 
The state elicited hearsay evidence concerning a statement the victim made to the 
appellant, an objection was made and sustained, and the state made an improper speaking 
objection/argument in front of the jury, (JT Tr p 592, 11 3-15). The Court was forced to 
instruct the state with a rudimentary explanation of the hearsay rule. 5 The state 
immediately made another improper attempt to place the same hearsay evidence in front 
of the jury, and another objection was made, (JT Tr p 592, 1123-25, p 593, 111-5). In 
response to the Court's ruling the jury was sent out again at the state's request, (JT Tr p 
593, 11 6-15). The appellant argues that the jury is once again left to speculate what 
evidence the appellant is attempting to hide from them- and why. The jury was sent out 
at the state's request on this occasion, but the jury could still blame the appellant for 
obstructing the process, i.e., when the judge earlier ruled, "Well, you have to ask counsel. 
He's got a right to hold you to the Rules of Evidence.", (JT Tr p 515, 1112-14). 
The next evidentiary debacle is the state's attempt to enter into evidence State's 
Exhibit *-029. The exhibit is offered, and the appellant is forced to once again request 
the jury be excused, (JT Tr p 660, 11 5-25, p 661, 111-10). The state argued for admission 
of the audio tape as follows: "I have no intention of playing it, but its existence, Judge, is 
4 Same discourse: Appellant objection to hearsay, sustained, followed by a leading question with requisite 
objection, sustained, with the Court instructing the prosecutor, "It is a leading question, Counsel. You have 
to ask nonleading questions of the witness.", (JT Tr p 655 1-17). 
5 "THE COURT: It is-the defendant is talking, but he is talking about something that someone else said, 
not under oath, to prove the truth of the matter asserted. It is a hearsay statement trying to be elicited from 
this witness, so I will sustain the objection.", (JT Tr p 592, 11 10-15). 
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relevant. I'm only moving to admit it. Its admission is not playing --or publication is not 
required once a piece of evidence has been admitted.", (JT p 663, 11 13-1 
The Court then explains rule: COURT: Well, no. Actually the rule is 
just the opposite. If you admit the recording, then an admitted exhibit that the jury can 
take back to the jury room must be played and published-- ... So you can't just introduce 
a two-and-a-half hour tape and tell jury they can listen to it if they want to. 
It has to be published to the jury in open court." (JT Tr p 663, 11 18-21, p 664, 11 2-
5). The audio tape is excluded by the Court for many reasons, (JT Tr p 667, 11 20-25, 
through p 670, 11 1-5), the Court later gives an instruction admonishing the jury not to 
speculate about the contents of the exhibit that was withdrawn, (JT Tr p 682, 11 4-15), but 
once again, this extended delay in the trial was commenced when the appellant was 
forced to request the jury be excused to argue about an exhibit that should have never 
even been mentioned in the first place. 
The Court is again forced to abandon its role as neutral arbiter in sustaining the 
appellant's "leading" objection when the state asks, "Okay. Can you tell me any times 
that - you said this discussion would have happened after the oral sex happened, 
correct?", (JT Tr p 783, 11 9-12). In response to the state's query, (in front of the jury), 
"Is that not I mean, am I misunderstanding is that not what she testified to? Can I not 
ask her ifl understood her testimony?", (JT p 783, 11 17-20). The Court then explains 
what a leading question is, admonishes the prosecutor that she cannot use leading 
questions, and further elucidates, "THE COURT: Because counsel has allowed a 
question to be asked before that was leading, does not mean he cannot object to a second 
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leading question. It is up to him if he chooses to object under the rules of evidence."6, 
Tr p 783, 11 21-25, p 78411 1-6). 
Near the end of the state's case in chief, the state attempts to establish through a 
law enforcement officer the appellant's date of birth, (JT Tr p 1021, 1122-25). These 
attempts with the requisite four objections go on for some four pages in the jury trial 
transcript, (JT Tr p 1022, 11 1-25, through p 1025, 11 1-3). The appellant makes 
essentially the same foundation and hearsay objections7 over what appears to the jury to 
be an innocuous point- the defendant's date of birth. The jury is unaware that the state 
must establish this essential element of their case to survive an ICR 29 motion.8 Once 
again, the jury could be wondering why appellant's counsel is wasting their time. 
During the state's cross-examination of the appellant, the state tries to elicit the 
location of a scanner in the appellant's office for reasons not discemable from the record. 
Appellant's attorney shows restraint by allowing the state to flounder for some two-and-
one-half pages in the trial transcript, and finally objects without stating a basis for the 
objection when the prosecutor improperly/argumentatively states, "Well, I need you to 
take as long as you need to think about that-", (JT Tr p 1102, 11 23-25, through p 1105, 
111-5). The Court's frustration is apparent in ruling, "THE COURT: I will sustain the 
objection. You asked him several times, Counsel, so move on. He is not telling you 
what you want to hear, but maybe he is not going to. Ask the next question.", (JT Tr p 
1105, 118-11). The Court's comment, " ... but maybe he is not going to.", could be 
6 Appellant again argues that instructing the jury, "It is up to him ifhe chooses to object under the rules of 
evidence.", is improper for all the aforementioned reasons. Making evidentiary objections is a strategic 
decision by counsel, but for the judge to use this language in the context of this discourse is clearly 
erroneous. 
7 It is noteworthy that these objections are not on the basis of" leading". 
8 The Court finally allows the date of birth in over objection when the witness mentions that the 
information came from the defendant's driver's license, which appellant argues is an erroneous ruling as 
information from a driver's license constitutes hearsay. 
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construed by the jury to mean that the defendant is withholding damaging information 
from the jury. The Court is once again forced out of its role as neutral arbiter. 
The state argues that most of appellant's trial objections were made when the 
state asked leading questions. Even if "leading" was in fact the only objection made, this 
would be sufficient to warrant the relief requested due to the quantity and ongoing nature 
of this questioning, but there were many more and varied objections made and sustained. 
The state presented pictures of the victim in various states of dress to the 
appellant, and the prosecutor asks, "Q. Showing you Exhibit *-002. There's two pictures 
on there, top and bottom. Can you verbally describe what Breana is doing in that 
photograph?", (JT Tr p 1133, 11 5-14). Appellant's objection is sustained, with the Court 
ruling that the photographs are "self-explanatory and speak for themselves." The 
question was improper because the appellant's opinion regarding what Breana was doing 
was not relevant. The question was an attempt to solicit salacious testimony from the 
appellant in front of the jury. Another attempt is made to solicit damaging and irrelevant 
testimony two pages later when the prosecutor asks, "Q. When she said that "My 
boyfriend likes it," what did you believe she meant by that?", (JT Tr p 1135, 11 8-9). The 
state goes on for some five pages in the transcript asking the same type of inappropriate 
questions eliciting improper testimony from the appellant describing what is depicted in 
admitted exhibits where the judge has already ruled said exhibits speak for themselves: 
"These two photographs are different shots than the one on page ten, correct?" (JT Tr p 
1136, 11 3-4); "And so while she is laying there, is it correct that on page 11 she has lifted 
up her shirt again and she's exposing her breasts with her bra covering them; correct?", 
(JT Tr p 1136, 11 8-11); "Then on page 12, there are two close-up shots showing her head 
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and breasts, with her bra on; correct?", (JT Tr p 1136, 11 13-15); "These two shots on 
page 13, they are different that the ones that are on page 12; correct?" ( JT p 113 7, 11 
7-9); "Then at some point sir, on page 14 she has exposed her bare breasts completely; 
c01Tect?", (JT p 113 8, 11 l 0-11 ). The Court finally tem1inates the line of questioning 
in response to the appellant's objection of "asked and answered", by holding: "THE 
COURT: I will sustain the objection. Counsel, why don't we move on to the rest of the 
photographs.", (JT Tr p 1140, 1123, through p 1141, 111-2). 
The next improper dialogue occurs when the state asks a series of questions 
regarding the appellant's interrogation by police during the investigation, which starts 
with the prosecutor asking, "You are not here to tell this jury here that you don't 
understand that he was talking about photographs on storage device?", (JT Tr p 1188, 11 
25, through p 1189, 11 1-2). One page later, "On purpose you were withholding 
information from him?", (JT Tr p 1190, 11 8-9). The court sustained both objections as 
"argumentative", and ended the line of questioning by sustaining the appellant's "asked 
and answered" objection one page later, ruling, "THE COURT. I will sustain the 
objection. Counsel, move on v.ith the cross-examination. You have made your point on 
this", (JT Tr pp 1191, 113-7). Once again, the Court felt compelled, after sustaining two 
objections regarding this issue, to order the prosecutor to "move on", and then improperly 
educated tlie prosecutor and/or inappropriately called attention to the evidence in front of 
the jury by stating "You have made your point on this". 
The state argues the Court properly denied the motion for mistrial, " ... because the 
trial was not rendered unfair by the single sentence at issue.", (Respondent's Brf, p 9). 
This single sentence is testimony by state's witness Todd Vandehey, "Photographs of his 
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wife in a negligee"., (JT Tr p 517, 1111-14). The state argues this testimony was a "brief 
reference" to inadmissible evidence '·was not so prejudicial to overwhelm admissible 
evidence.", (Respondent's p 9). This fallacious argument ignores the fact this 
single sentence what was arguably the most damaging evidence elicited by the state- that 
the defendant showed another male pictures of his v,:ife in a negligee. The Court had 
ruled this evidence was inadmissible on three separate occasions.9 
In pronouncing sentence, the Court mentioned there is always a temptation to 
sentence a defendant based not on what the jury found him guilty of but with what he was 
charged, the Court speculates about other cases with hung juries, that there is some 70 to 
80 percent chance that defendants are found guilty at a retrial, and finally, that some 
jurors favored conviction on counts for which no verdict was reached, (See Appellant's 
Brf, p 15). The state dismisses the Court's unfavorable/improper comments by arguing 
that the Court somehow rectified the situation by stating in one sentence that it "must 
sentence [Sigler] on what he has been found guilty of, not what he has been accused of.", 
(Respondent's Brf, p. 17). This single statement is woefully inadequate to purge the 
appearance of taint in light of the Court's prior comments. 
The state cites State v Flowers, 150 Idaho 568,574 (2010), for the proposition 
that the Court can consider, " ... the defendant's conduct/or which he has been tried and 
acquitted. '' The Court in Flowers cites United States v. Watts, 117 S.Ct. 633, 519 U.S. 
148 (1997), and holds: 
9 It is again worth noting the prosecutor's question to this witness, "Okay, And when you were in his office, 
what photographs do you remember Mr. Sigler showing you?", is the type of question that the prosecutor 
should have known could/would result in the unacceptable answer given. 
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"A jury's verdict acquittal does not prevent a sentencing court from considering 
conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been by a 
preponderance of the evidence.", (emphasis added). 
In this case, the state did not prove conduct by competent evidence any 
burden of proof analysis of the charge for which the appellant was acquitted or of the 
charges on vvfoch the jury could not reach a verdict. The Judge's comments clearly 
demonstrate that he placed improper emphasis on these charges. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Both the sheer number of objections required, and the on-going necessity of 
making continuing and repetitive objections to the same evidentiary missteps by the 
prosecutor, had the effect of both antagonizing the jury and prejudicing the appellant in 
the jury's eyes, such that he was denied due process by the cumulative effect of that 
conduct by the prosecutor, and the appellant was denied a fair trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of March, 2013. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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